Touro Law Review
Volume 11

Number 3

Article 51

1995

Power of Courts

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons

Recommended Citation
(1995) "Power of Courts," Touro Law Review: Vol. 11: No. 3, Article 51.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/51

This New York State Constitutional Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

et al.: Power Of Courts

1020

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 11

insignificant clerical errors." 74 This interpretation is in complete
accord with the status of New York law.
The development of the issue of amending an indictment by a
grand jury has been the same in both the federal and New York

jurisdictions. The common law principle was very strict, in that
amendments were not at all permitted. In modem times, the rule
has evolved to allow for some modification of an indictment, but
only to the extent that such alteration relates only to the most
basic elements of form.

SUPREME COURT
KINGS COUNTY
People v. Williams 75
(decided December 9, 1994)

In Williams, the constitutional issue raised was whether the
supreme court could retain jurisdiction over a suppression motion

stemming from a weapons charge, involving a juvenile, after it
had been severed from other charges. 76 After examining article

77
VI, sections 7(a) and (b) of the New York State Constitution,

74. Id. at 194. See United States v. Field, 875 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1989)
(quoting United States v. Field, 659 F.2d 163, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating
that amendments were permitted regarding matters of form); United States v.
Nabors, 762 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1985) (eliminating mere surplusage is
allowable).
75. 1994 WL 744862, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Dec. 9, 1994). This
case, pending publication, will be reported at 622 N.Y.S.2d 654.
76. Id. at *2. The court's decision to sever the weapons counts from the
robbery counts was based on the fact that "[t]he evidence of one offense would
not have been admissible at the trial of the other, since there was no indication
that the same weapon was involved." Id. at *3.

77. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7. Article VI, section 7 provides:
a. The supreme court shall have general original jurisdiction in law and
equity and the appellate jurisdiction herein provided. In the city of New
York, it shall have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes prosecuted by
indictment, provided, however, that the legislature may grant to the
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the court found that "[as juvenile delinquency proceedings are
statutory creations, the constitution automatically vests the
supreme court with jurisdiction over them." 78 Therefore, the
court held that the supreme court had jurisdiction over the
sujppression motion when acting as a family court in a juvenile
proceeding. 7 9
In Williams, the defendant was charged with armed robbery
based on events which occurred on September 5, 1993, and
criminal possession of a weapon based on events which occurred
on September 15, 1993.80 The defendant made a motion for a

Dunaway,8 1 Payton,82 Mapp, 83 and Wade84 hearing which was
city-wide court of cribal jurisdiction of the city of New York
jurisdiction over misdemeanors prosecuted by indictment and to the
family court in the city of New York jurisdiction over crimes and
offenses by or against minors or between spouses or between parent and
child or between members of the same family or household.
b. If the legislature shall create new classes of actions and proceedings,
the supreme court shall have jurisdiction over such classes of actions
and proceedings, but the legislature may provide that another court or
other courts shall also have jurisdiction and that actions and proceedings
of such classes may be originated in such other court or courts.
Id.
78. Williams, 1994 WL 744862, at *4 (citing Kagan v. Kagan, 21 N.Y.2d
532, 536-37, 236 N.E.2d 475, 477-78, 289 N.Y.S.2d 195, 199-200 (1968)).
The Kagan court held that the "jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as provided
for under any other provision of the Constitution should be unaffected by this
grant of jurisdiction to the Family Court." Kagan, 21 N.Y.2d at 537-38, 236
N.E.2d at 478, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
79. Williams, 1994 WL 744862, at *3.
80. Williams, 1994 WL 744862, at *1.
81. A Dunaway hearing concerns suppression of the prosecutor's evidence.
The issue generally is whether the police had probable cause to arrest the
defendant. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
82. A Payton hearing concerns the suppression of physical evidence. The
issue generally is whether the police made a warrantless and nonconsensual
entry into the defendant's home in order to make an arrest. See Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
83. "A Mapp hearing concerns the suppression of physical evidence. The
issue generally is whether the police had probable cause, or the defendant's
consent, to conduct the search of either the defendant's person or property."
MULDOON & FEUERSTEIN, HANDLING A CRIMNAL CASE IN NEW YORK,

§ 7:19 (1994) (citations omitted).
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granted. 85 He also requested that the weapon counts be
87
severed. 8 6 This, as well, was granted, following the hearing.
The defendant was then tried and acquitted of the robbery counts,

but the court still had not decided the suppression motion
regarding the weapon counts. 88 In July 1994, the People
requested the court to remove the weapons count to family court,

claiming that the supreme court lost jurisdiction over this count at
the time of severance, and that "it must now remove those counts

to family court or dismiss the case without taking any further

action. "89
The court recognized that "the age of a defendant goes to the

jurisdiction, [however, courts have] not discuss[ed] the type of
jurisdiction at issue." 90 The Williams court discussed the
reasoning employed in People ex rel. Harrisonv. Jackson.9 1 In

Jackson, the majority failed to provide any guidance as to
"whether age goes to subject matter jurisdiction." 92 However,
the dissent stated that "those under sixteen years of age cannot be

convicted of crimes, and that the courts (other than children's

84. Muldoon and Feuerstein have defined a Wade hearing as follows:
A Wade hearing concerns police-initiated identifications of the
defendant, made either at the time and place of the offense, or on some
other occasion. The issue generally is the reasonableness of police
conduct, and the lack of suggestiveness, in conducting the identification.
If the identification is found to be objectionable, the issue is whether the
witness has an independent source upon which to ground an in-court
identification.
Id. (citations omitted).
85. Williams, 1994 WL 744862, at *1.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing People v. Stevenson, 17 N.Y.2d 682, 216 N.E.2d 615, 269
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1966)). In Stevenson, the court held that the case had to be
remanded to Family Court because the defendant was under the age of sixteen.
Stevenson, 17 N.Y.2d 682, 216 N.E.2d 615, 269 N.Y.S.2d 458.
91. 298 N.Y. 219, 82 N.E.2d 14 (1948).
92. Williams, 1994 WL 744862, at *2.
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courts) are wholly without jurisdiction to try or sentence such

persons." 93
The court went on to discuss the amendments to the Criminal
Procedure Law and how they have changed the court's power to
deal with children under sixteen. 94 In 1978, a class of designated
offenses was created which held thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen
year-old defendants criminally liable. 95 Then, in 1980, a new law
93. Jackson, 298 N.Y. at 234-35, 82 N.E.2d at 22 (Desmond, J.,
dissenting).
94. Williams, 1994 WL 744862, at *2.
95. Id. (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAWv § 190.71 (McKinney 1993) and
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1994)). Section 190.71 provides in
relevant part:
[A] grand jury may not indict
(i) a person thirteen years of age for any conduct or crime other than
conduct constituting a crime defined in subdivisions one and two of
section 125.25 (murder in the second degree);
(ii) a person fourteen or fifteen years of age for any conduct or crime
other than conduct constituting a crime defined in subdivisions one
and two of section 125.25 (murder in the second degree) and in
subdivision three of such section provided that the underlying
crime for the murder charge is one for which such person is
criminally responsible ....
N.Y. CRm. PROC. LAW § 190.71; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(2) provides in
pertinent part:
A person thirteen, fourteen or fifteen years of age is criminally
responsible for acts constituting murder in the second degree as defined
in subdivisions one and two of section 125.25 and in subdivision three
of such section provided that the* underlying crime for the murder
charge is one for which such person is criminally responsible; and a
person fourteen or fifteen years of age is criminally responsible for acts
constituting the crimes defined in section 135.25 (kidnapping in the first
degree); 150.20 (arson in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of
section 120.10 (assault in the first degree); 125.20 (manslaughter in the
first degree); subdivisions one and two of section 130.35 (rape in the
first degree); subdivisions one and two of section 130.50 (sodomy in the
first degree); 130.70 (aggravated sexual abuse); 140.30 (burglary in the
first degree); subdivision one of section 140.25 (burglary in the second
degree); 150.15 (arson in the second degree); 160.15 (robbery in the
first degree) or subdivision two of section 160.10 (robbery in the second
degree) of this chapter; or defined in this chapter as an attempt to
commit murder in the second degree or kidnapping in the first degree.
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was invoked which gave grand juries the authority to indict
juvenile offenders for "non-designated offenses if the offense is
properly joinable to a designated offense under CPL
200.20(6) .... "96 The Williams court emphasized the
importance of these amendments by stating that these laws
conferred subject matter jurisdiction upon the supreme court over
97
offenses that were previously adjudicated in family court.
The court recognized the rule, from In re Anthony J.,98 which

states that "a court may not acquire subject matter jurisdiction by
waiver, consent, estoppel, or laches." 99 However, there is an
exception to this rule when a court has subject matter
jurisdiction, but there is a challenge as to the court's jurisdiction
over a specific case. 100 The court found such exception applied
96. Williams, 1994 WL 744862, at *2. See N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAw
§ 200.20(6) (McKinney 1993). Section 200.20(6) provides:
Where an indictment charges at least one offense against a defendant
who was under the age of sixteen at the time of the commission of the
crime and who did not lack criminal responsibility for such crime by
reason of infancy, the indictment may, in addition, charge in separate
counts one or more other offenses for which such person would not have
been criminally responsible by reason of infancy if:
(a) the offense for which the defendant is criminally responsible and the
one or more other offenses for which he would not have been
criminally responsible by reason of infancy are based upon the
same act or upon the same criminal transaction, as that term is
defined in subdivision two of section 40.10 of this chapter; or
(b) the offenses are of such nature that either proof of the first offense
would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial
of the second, or proof of the second would be material and
admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the first.
Id.
97. Williams, 1994 WL 744862 at *2. Cf. Rodriguez v. Myerson, 69
A.D.2d 162, 418 N.Y.S.2d 936 (2d Dep't 1979) (stating that the Supreme
Court had no jurisdiction to hear a juvenile delinquency proceeding).
98. 143 A.D.2d 668, 532 N.Y.S.2d 924 (2d Dep't 1988).
99. Williams, 1994 WL 744862, at *2.
100. Id. See In re Rougeron's Estate, 17 N.Y.2d 264, 271, 217 N.E.2d
639, 643, 270 N.Y.S.2d 578, 583 (1966). "[The rule that subject-matter
jurisdiction cannot be born of waiver, consent, or estoppel has to do with those
cases only where the court has not been given any power to do anything at
all .... " Id.
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to the instant case because, although it had jurisdiction over the
non-designated offenses, there was an issue as to whether there
was proper joinder of the offenses. 10 1
The court found that the robbery and weapon counts should be
severed. 1 02 It based its decision on several grounds. First, the
issue involving the defendant's juvenile status was only raised
when the indictment was amended, not when it was before the
grand jury. 103 Second, the issue concerning joinder of the counts
was not raised until the suppression hearing. 104 It was not until
the hearing was concluded that the court decided it would sever
the counts. 105 At this time, decision on the weapon counts was
reserved.1 06
It was only when the People moved to have the case removed
to family court that the defendant raised the issue of
jurisdiction.10 7 Since the robbery and weapon counts were
related on the issues of suppression, the court found that the
supreme court had jurisdiction over both counts until it made its
108
decision to sever the robbery counts.
The Williams court noted that, even if the court did not have
jurisdiction as a criminal court, because the weapon count was
improperly joined, the court would have had jurisdiction anyway
as a family court. 109 The court based its conclusion on the New
York Constitution, article VI, section 7(b). 110 Section 7(b)
"confers the [s]upreme [c]ourt with jurisdiction not just over
classes of actions created after [it was adopted], but also classes

101. Williams, 1994 WL 744862, at *2.
102. Id. at *3.
103. Id. The court based its conclusion on the fact that "(t]he evidence of
one offense would not have been admissible at the trial of the other, since there
was no indication that the same weapon was involved." Id.
104. Id.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7(b).
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recognized at the time of its adoption." 11 1 Therefore, section
7(b) gave the supreme court "'original, unlimited, and
unqualified jurisdiction.' ' 112 The court also noted that the
substantive law relating to suppression motions were very similar
or the same in both the family court and the supreme court.
Moreover, the supreme court had already held a hearing and,
thus, was better able to decide certain issues such as
credibility. 113
In conclusion, although it may be the legislature's desire that
the family court handle the sensitive matters involved in juvenile
delinquency proceedings, such concerns no longer exist where
the court is "deciding a suppression motion after a hearing
involving the same issue." 114 Consequently, it is evident that the
supreme courts of New York will always retain their power of
original jurisdiction, expressly granted by the New York State
Constitution, where such protections have been waived by a prior
disposition of the same issue and the procedural rules pertaining
to suppression possess no material differences.
CIVIL COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY

Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v. Duralum Corp. 115
(printed May 6, 1994)

The Special Term, First Department addressed the issue of
whether a party being sued by an agency of the State of New
York in a civil court action can institute a counterclaim against
that agency in the Civil Court or whether the suit must be
111. Williams, 1994 WL 744862, at *3 (citing Kagen v. Kagen, 21 N.Y.2d
532, 537, 236 N.E.2d 475, 478, 289 N.Y.S.2d 195, 200 (1968)).
112. Id. at *4 (citing Kagen, 21 N.Y.2d at 537, 236 N.E.2d at 478, 289
N.Y.S.2d at 199).
113. Williams, 1994 WL 744862, at *3.
114. Id. at *4.
115. N.Y. L.J., May 6, 1994, at 31 (Civ. Ct. New York County 1994).
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